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INTRODUCTION
According to any number of prominent sources, patent law in gen-
eral, and claim construction in particular, are in a state of crisis.' Patent
t © 2009 by Eileen M. Herlihy. All rights reserved.
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I. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (Princeton Univ. Press
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law in general has been criticized for failing to give the public fair notice
of patent coverage, and for failing to achieve its intended purpose of
promoting innovation.2 With respect to claim construction, the reversal
rates for district court decisions are high,3 and this is widely viewed as an
indication that the rules of claim construction are unclear and confusing,
perhaps even contradictory.4 Moreover, as a result of the high reversal
rates based on claim constructions, many patent cases proceed through
long, costly trials only to be remanded following appeal for retrial in
light of new claim constructions.5 This predicament makes the actual and
perceived cost of enforcing patents exorbitant.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has stepped in to
consider and decide a record number of patent cases in order to deal with
some of these problems. The Court has reversed and revised a number of
holdings of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,6
the specialized court established by Congress in 1982 to hear, among
other things, appeals in patent cases.7 In a number of these cases, the Su-
preme Court held that the Federal Circuit had established special rules
for patent cases that needed to be changed to bring them in line with
more general principles of law. For instance, in eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change, L.L.C., the Supreme Court reviewed the "general rule"
established by the Federal Circuit "that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circum-
2008); William H. Burgess, Comment, Simplicity at the Cost of Clarity: Appellate Review of
Claim Construction and the Failed Promise of Cybor, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 763 (2004); Kim-
berly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 231 (2005).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting from
dismissal of writ of certiorari); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1.
3. See Moore, supra note 1, at 233 (following Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370 (1996), the Federal Circuit reversed the district courts' claim construction in
34.5 percent of the cases from 1996 through 2003); see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075,
1104 (2001) ("[Tlhe Federal Circuit reversed 29.6% of cases involving an express review of
claim construction."); Andrew T, Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction In the Trial
Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON
HALL L. REv, 711,745-46 (2003) (41.5 percent reversal rate in 2001).
4. See Burgess, supra note 1; Moore, supra note 1, at 231 & n.2,
5. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir
2006), reh'g denied, 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2270 (2007).
6. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118
(2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); I11. Tool Works Inc. v. In-
dep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
7. Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant
provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1
(1989).
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stances." '8 The Supreme Court held that by applying a general rule favoring
permanent injunctions following a finding of infringement, the Federal
Circuit "erred in its categorical grant of such relief."9 The Supreme Court
directed the Federal Circuit to apply the traditional four-factor test
"[a]ccording to well-established principles of equity" 0
Despite its recent increased willingness to review issues arising in
patent cases, however, there is an important area into which the Supreme
Court has rarely ventured: the application of the Seventh Amendment in
patent cases. The Court's landmark decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc." is its only major decision in this area. In the Markman
case, the Supreme Court considered the applicability of the Seventh
Amendment'2 to patent claim construction issues and ultimately held that
"the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is
exclusively within the province of the court."'3 While the holding is abso-
lute and clear, the precise legal basis for the holding has generated
controversy among the judges of the Federal Circuit, practitioners and
legal scholars."' Moreover, since its Markman decision in 1997, the
8. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (citing MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d
1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
9. Id. at 394.
10. Id. at 391,394.
11. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
12. The Seventh Amendment states in relevant part that "[i]n Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
13, Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.
14. Commentators have taken varying positions about whether the Supreme Court's
Markman decision is based on a rationale that claim construction must be treated as a pure
issue of law, and whether the decision acknowledges that claim construction has a factual
component. See, e.g., David Krinsky, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and the Role of Ap-
pellate Deference in Patent Claim Construction Appeals, 66 MD. L. REv. 194, 194-98 (2006).
Krinsky takes the view that the Supreme Court's Markman decision requires that claim con-
struction be treated as a "pure matter of law," Id. at 197, and that "the Supreme Court's holding
that claim constructions should be granted stare decisis effect implies that they cannot be
based on fact-finding about which the Federal Circuit has granted deferrence to a trial court:'
Id, Acknowledging statements in the Supreme Court decision "that claim construction could
implicate underlying factual inquiries," Burgess, supra note 1, at 775, while also classifying
the statements as "essentially dicta," Id,, and stating that ".,,, [t]he Supreme Court opinion
may be read as having granted an exception to Rule 52(a) for policy reasons ..... Id. at 776,
The Supreme Court in its Markman decision "acknowledged that claim construction is a
'mongrel practice,' neither clearly law nor fact ... :' Andrew S. Brown, AMGEN v. HMR: A
Case for Deference in Claim Construction, 20 HARv, J.L. & TEcH. 479, 487 (2007) (footnotes
omitted). Referring to the "apparent inconsistency" in pointing out that "while the Court ruled
that ascertaining the meaning of a patent claim is 'a matter of law' for the judge, not a jury, to
decide, the Court also noted that claim construction is a 'mongrel practice' that 'falls some-
where between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact':' Donald R. Dunner,
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies: The Final Say on Appellate Review of Claim Construc-
tion?, 80 J. PAT. & TitADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 481, 483-92 (1998).
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Supreme Court has avoided deciding any further Seventh Amendment
issues in patent cases. In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemi-
cal Co., the Supreme Court upheld the viability of the doctrine of
equivalents but expressly declined to rule directly on whether, and to
what extent, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents should be
decided by a judge or jury under the Seventh Amendment. 5 With the
exception of the Markman case, decisions in the area of the Seventh
Amendment in patent cases have been left to the Federal Circuit.
The Supreme Court should accept certiorari in patent cases in which
the application of the Seventh Amendment is at issue. Such Supreme
Court review could be crucial since some of the positions taken by the
Federal Circuit relating both directly and indirectly to the Seventh
Amendment have in large part been responsible for creating areas of
"crisis" in patent law. There should be no room for unwarranted special
rules in patent cases in areas directly or indirectly related to the Seventh
Amendment. Principled decisions in the application of the Seventh
Amendment in patent cases would go a long way towards resolving
many of the areas that are viewed as in "crisis." This Article will address
one of several'6 such areas: the standard of appellate review of patent
claim construction. While the standard of appellate review of claim con-
struction is not in and of itself a Seventh Amendment issue, the Federal
Circuit has formulated a standard of review based upon its resolution of
a fact versus law distinction in the application of the Seventh Amend-
ment. Therefore, the Seventh Amendment lies at the heart of the problem
of the standard of review of patent claim construction.
Patent claim construction issues are among the most significant in
patent cases and may often be outcome determinative. As Judge Rich
famously stated "the name of the game is the claim."'7 It is well known
The conflicting views of the judges of the Federal Circuit regarding the proper reading of
the Supreme Court's Markman decision are discussed in detail throughout this Article.
15. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38-39 (1997). The
Supreme Court stated:
Because resolution of whether, or how much of, the application of the doctrine of
equivalents can be resolved by the court is not necessary for us to answer the ques-
tion presented, we decline to take it up. The Federal Circuit held that it was for the
jury to decide whether the accused process was equivalent to the claimed process.
There was ample support in our prior cases for that holding....
Whether, if the issue were squarely presented to us, we would reach a different con-
clusion than did the Federal Circuit is not a question we need decide today.
Id.
16. Other areas in which Seventh Amendment decisions of the Federal Circuit have
contributed to problems in patent law will be addressed in future articles.
17. Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American Per-
spectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990), quoted in Hilton
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that the scope of intellectual property rights associated with any given
patent is determined based on the claims of the patent.'8 In seeking pat-
ent protection, an inventor may define the terms used in the description
of the invention and the claims," thereby acting as his or her own "lexi-
cographer."20 When it comes to the words used by an inventor in a patent
and its claims, it is important that they should convey an understanding
of the invention to a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the
relevant art,2' particularly when read in light of the prosecution history22
of the patent.23 In theory, then, the claims of a patent should give notice
to those of ordinary skill in the relevant art as to the scope of the patent.
In practice, however, the proper meaning of patent claims is frequently
hotly contested, particularly when the patent is extremely valuable
commercially.24 Moreover, as previously noted, there is a high rate of
reversal on appeal of patent claims construed by trial courts, 2 creating
problems for both those attempting to enforce patent rights and those
attempting to steer clear of patent infringement problems. The standard
of review on appeal currently applied to claim construction issues is fre-
quently cited as the problem causing the high reversal rates.
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J.,
with whom Archer, C.J., and Rich & Lourie, JJ., join, dissenting).
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
19. The description of the invention and the originally filed claims are collectively
called the "specification". See id.
20. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
21. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)) ("When
interpreting claims, we inquire into how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have un-
derstood claim terms at the time of the invention.").
22. The prosecution history of a patent is the written record of the proceedings associ-
ated with the application for and allowance of a patent.
23. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 476 F.3d 1321, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314) ("A person of ordinary skill in the art is
deemed to have read the claim term in the context of the entire patent, including the other
claims, the specification and the prosecution history."); Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc.,
66 F.3d 1211, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring) ("Claim interpretation demands an
objective inquiry into how one of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention
would comprchend the disputed word or phrase in view of the patent claims, specification, and
prosecution history.").
24. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033 (2007) ("In patent law, there are few
problems more significant, or more hotly debated, than the problem of [claim] interpreta-
tion?'); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv.
101, 101, 108 (2005) (Patent claims are "central to virtually every aspect of patent law," and
"[o]ne of the most significant aspects of patent litigation is 'claim construction,"' which is
"often outcome-determinative in infringement cases.").
25. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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The Federal Circuit stated in an en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Technologies, Inc. that the construction of patent claims is "a purely
legal issue," and is therefore subject to de novo review on appeal.16 The
Cybor decision reaffirmed the position of the majority of the Federal
Circuit which had been announced in its en banc Markman decision,27
and proclaimed that the de novo standard of review is supported by the
Supreme Court's Markman decision,2 a Seventh Amendment opinion.
However, Cybor included strong opposition to a de novo standard of re-
view from some of the judges of the Federal Circuit.29 Moreover, in
subsequent cases, the consistent citation of Cybor in support of the ap-
plication of a de novo standard of review of claim construction has
continued to generate scathing dissents from numerous judges of the
Federal Circuit" and strong criticism from other members of the bench
and bar.3' Even Congress has taken up the issue, proposing in pending
reform legislation to grant trial judges the authority to certify interloca-
26. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
27. Id. (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc)).
28. Id.
29. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463-72 (Mayer, C.J., joined by Newman, J., concurring in
judgment but disagreeing with opinion); id. at 1473-78 (Rader, J., dissenting from the "pro-
nouncements on claim interpretation in the en banc opinion," concurring in the judgement,
and joining part IV of the opinion); id. at 1478-81 (Newman, J., joined by Mayer, C.J,, filing
"additional views" critical of the de novo standard of review).
30. See, e.g, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330-35 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Mayer wrote an impassioned dissent
against the de novo standard of review, stating in part:
Now more than ever I am convinced of the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this
court's persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter
of law devoid of any factual component. Because any attempt to fashion a coherent
standard under this regime is pointless, as illustrated by our many failed attempts to
do so, I dissent....
In the name of uniformity, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), held that claim construction does not involve subsidiary
or underlying questions of fact and that we are, therefore, unbridled by either the
expertise or efforts of the district court. What we have wrought, instead, is the sub-
stitution of a black box, as it so pejoratively has been said of the jury, with the black
hole of.this court. Out of this void we emit "legal" pronouncements by way of "in-
terpretive necromancy"; these rulings resemble reality, if at all, only by chance.
Id. at 1330 (footnotes omitted).
31. See, e.g., Br. for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 17-21, Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303, No. 03-1269; Br. for Federal Circuit Bar As-
sociation as Amicus Curiae at 7-9, Phillips, 415 E.3d 1303, No. 03-1269; Cheryl Lee Johnson,
The False Premise and Promises of Markman's Decision to Task Judges with Claim Construc-
tion and the Judicial Scorecard, 837 PLI/PAT 9, 67 (2005); Kathleen M. O'Malley, Patti Saris
& Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the
District Judge, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 671, 679 (2004) (Judge Saris voiced the opinion that
there should be more deference to the trial judge in claim construction).
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tory appeals on claim construction issues in order to try to stem the tide
of high reversal rates following full trials." Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari in at least three recent cases in which the de
novo standard of review from Cybor was under attack.3 While there was
a sharp division of opinion among the judges of the Federal Circuit in
Cybor, all of the judges relied on the Supreme Court's Markman deci-
sion, a Seventh Amendment case, to support differing views. It is clear
that there is disagreement among the judges of the Federal Circuit re-
garding the basis of the holding in the Supreme Court's Markman
decision. In Cybor, the majority of the Federal Circuit judges chose to
view all the subsidiary questions involved in the construction of patent
claims as matters of "law," indirectly holding that there are no issues of
fact involved in claim construction. Is this view supported by the Su-
preme Court in its Markman analysis? Has the Federal Circuit engaged
in creating unwarranted special rules for patent cases in the area of the
Seventh Amendment? Should the Federal Circuit be free to define all the
subsidiary questions involved in the construction of patent claims as
matters of "law:' thereby indirectly acting as its own lexicographer with
respect to the term "fact" in the Seventh Amendment?"
Part I of this Article examines whether the Cybor rule of de novo ap-
pellate review of patent claim construction is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent, focusing primarily on Seventh Amendment decisions.
Part II discusses whether or not it is appropriate for the Federal Circuit
to set the boundary between issues of fact and issues of law in patent
cases. Finally, Part III addresses the extent to which various proposed
standards of appellate review of claim construction are principled, with
particular emphasis on the Seventh Amendment.
32. See S. 515, 11 1th Cong. (as amended on Apr. 2, 2009, by S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary) (proposing a new 35 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(3)); see also HAROLD C. WEGNER, JUDICIAL
PATENT REFORM IN THE I I ITH CONGRESS: NEW SOLUTIONS FOR KNOWN PROBLEMS 3, 16-
24 (2009), http://www.ipfrontline.com/downloads/AkronConferenceWegnerPaper.pdf.
33. Amgen Inc. v, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006), reh'g
denied, 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed, Cir 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2270 (2007); Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006); Rattler
Tools, Inc. v. Bilco Tools, Inc., Nos. 05-CV-0293, 05-CV-3777, 2007 WL 2008504, at *1
(ED. La. 2007), reh'g denied, 278 F App'x 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
903 (2009).
34. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
35. See Burgess, supra note 1, at 777 ("For this analysis, I simply accept the proposi-
tion that, because the Federal Circuit is the central judicial authority on the patent law, it is
to some extent the court's prerogative to label issues as fact or law as it sees fit:') (footnote
omitted).
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I. CYBOR's RULE OF DE Novo REVIEW CONSIDERED IN
LIGHT OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
"You might just as well say," added the Dormouse, which
seemed to be talking in its sleep, "that 'I breath when I sleep' is
the same thing as 'I sleep when I breathe!' "
-Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
A. Cybor and the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment
Decision in Markman
In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc. ,36 the Federal Circuit at-
tempted, in an en banc decision, to eliminate any past confusion and to
put an end to prior conflicting decisions" regarding the proper standard
of appellate review of claim construction issues by "reaffirming" a de
novo standard of review.
[W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we re-
view claim construction de novo on appeal including any
allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.
Accordingly, we today disavow any language in previous opin-
ions of this court that holds, purports to hold, states, or suggests
anything to the contrary ....38
The majority in Cybor announced that the de novo standard of review
had previously been set forth in its en banc decision in Markman v. West-
view Instruments, Inc. ,9 and that the Federal Circuit was reaffirming this
standard of review on the basis that the subsequent decision of the Su-
preme Court in Markman4° did not change it.4 ' The majority in Cybor
stated that the Supreme Court, in its Markman decision, addressed the
issue of "under which category, fact or law, claim construction should
fall" and that "[n]othing in the Supreme Court's opinion supports the
view that the Court endorsed a silent, third option-that claim construc-
tion may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact., 4 2 The
majority in Cybor professed that the Markman decision of the Supreme
36. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1448.
37. See Donald R. Dunner & Howard A. Kwon, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies: The
Final Say on Appellate Review of Claim Construction?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
481,482-89 (1998).
38. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456 (emphasis added).
39. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
40. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
41. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456.
42. Id. at 1455 (footnote omitted).
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Court "conclusively and repeatedly states that claim construction is
purely legal."4' 3
Not all of the Federal Circuit judges agreed with the majority view
that a de novo standard of review was appropriate or that it was consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's Markman decision. While concurring with
the judgement in the case, Chief Judge Mayer, joined by Judge Newman,
stated that "I respectfully disagree with the opinion because it pro-
foundly misapprehends" the Supreme Court's Markman decision."4
Judge Rader dissented "from the pronouncements on claim interpreta-
tion," stating that the Supreme Court's Markman decision "repeatedly
intimated that claim construction was not a purely legal matter."
45
In fact, far from resolving conflicts among the judges of the Federal
Circuit, the en banc Cybor decision of the Federal Circuit highlighted the
strong disagreement among some of the judges and resulted in an opinion
with six separate sections46: a majority decision; two concurring opinions;
7
43. Id. at 1456.
44. Id. at 1463 (Mayer, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
45. Id. at 1473 (Rader, J. dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 1451-62.
47. Id. at 1462-63 (Plager, J. concurring); id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring). While
Judge Plager expressly concurred in the decision that claim construction should be reviewed
de novo on appeal, he made the following statements which appear to support a flexible re-
view:
Though we review that record "de novo," meaning without applying a formally def-
erential standard of review, common sense dictates that the trial judge's view will
carry weight. That weight may vary depending on the care, as shown in the record,
with which that view was developed, and the information on which it is based.
Id. at 1462 (Plager, J. concurring). Judge Plager further appeared to advocate a practical wait-
and-see approach under which a de novo standard of review would be kept, at least for the
time being.
Our purpose is to improve the process of patent infringement litigation for the bene-
fit of patentees and their competitors, and ultimately the public. Whether this
approach to patent litigation will in the long run prove beneficial remains to be
seen. There is every reason to believe it will, and certainly to believe it is better than
what we had. But it may be some time before we have enough experience with
"Markman hearings" and with appellate review under the new regime to draw any
empirically sound conclusions. In such circumstances there is much to be said for
refraining from premature and argumentative judgments about what it all means,
and for allowing sufficient time to actually see how it works.
Id. at 1463. Judge Bryson concurred "without reservation," but also appeared to endorse a
somewhat flexible standard of review. Id. at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring). Referring to possi-
ble cases in which claim construction evidence might involve competing expert witness
testimony and a credibility judgment, Judge Bryson stated that "in those cases it would be
entirely appropriate-and consistent with our characterization of claim construction as a ques-
tion of law-to factor into our legal analysis the district court's superior access to one of the
pertinent tools of construction." Id.
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an opinion concurring in the judgment;' an opinion dissenting in part,
joining in part and concurring in the judgment; 9 and a section referred to
as "additional views."' The rift among the judges of the Federal Circuit
in Cybor was based almost entirely on differing interpretations of the
analysis provided by the Supreme Court in Markman."
A key question, therefore, is what is the basis of the Supreme Court's
holding in Markman? In evaluating the decision, it is important to con-
duct the same in-depth review that is routinely applied to the
construction of patent claims. In construing a patent claim, the intrinsic
record is of the utmost importance. The words of the claim are consid-
ered in the context of the specification and are analyzed in light of the
file history. By analogy, the words of the Supreme Court holding in
Markman should be reviewed with regard to the opinion as a whole, and
should be analyzed in the context of the Federal Circuit's en banc
Markman decision" below. Sound bites from the cases are not sufficient
to fairly determine the basis of the opinion.
The Markman case involved a question of claim construction of a
business method patent. The patent in suit claimed an inventory control
48. Id. at 1463-72 (Mayer, C.J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Newman, J.). As
previously noted, Chief Judge Mayer concurred in the judgment but disagreed emphatically
with the rationale of the majority opinion.
49. Id. at 1473-78 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment). As previ-
ously noted, Judge Rader strongly dissented from the majority view that claim construction is
purely a matter of law.
50. Id. at 1478-81 (additional views of Newman, J., joined by Mayer, C.J.). Judge
Newman's "additional views" disagree with the majority position that claim construction is
purely a matter of law. Judge Newman was highly critical of the majority opinion and stated:
"I strongly disagree with the majority's view of the role of extrinsic evidence, at trial and as
considered on appeal." Id. at 1481. Moreover, Judge Newman disagreed with the majority's
reading of the Supreme Court's Markman decision, stating that the Supreme Court recognized
a "factual component" to claim construction.
In Markman the en banc court took the position that in patent cases, unlike any
other area of the law, a disputed question of the meaning, scope, and usage of terms
of technologic art is not a question of fact, or even of law based on underlying fact,
but is pure law. However, the Supreme Court has relieved us of adherence to this
fiction, by its recognition of the factual component of claim interpretation.
Id. at 1480.
51. Compare supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text with supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
52. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In the Federal Circuit's Cybor decision, the majority labels its own
Markman en banc decision as Markman I, while referring to the Supreme Court's Markman
decision as Markman H. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451-54. The author of this article declines to use
the commonly applied labels Markman I and Markman II to describe these opinions because
the labels appear to imply a parity between the authority of the Federal Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court which is, of course, misleading. In this article, the author will refer to
the opinions as the Federal Circuit's Markman decision and the Supreme Court's Markman
decision.
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system for dry-cleaning businesses. 3 The patent owner accused the de-
fendants of infringement of specific claims of the patent in suit based on
the defendants' use of a system that tracked invoices attached to articles
of clothing left by customers for dry cleaning. 4 At issue was the mean-
ing of the term "inventory" within the patent claims."5
The case was originally tried to a jury that was instructed as part of
its charge to "determine the meaning of the claims." 6 The jury found
infringement of some of the asserted patent claims in response to general
interrogatories. 7 Thereafter, the trial judge granted a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law (JMOL) for the defendants, stating that claim
construction is a matter of law for the court. 8 The trial judge construed
the term "inventory" within the meaning of the claims as "articles of
clothing," and directed a verdict of non-infringement for the defendants,
finding that the method the defendants employed tracked a listing of in-
voices and case totals rather than articles of clothing. 9 The patent owner
53. Markman, 52 F.3d at 971-92. Claim 1 of U.S. Reissue Patent No. 33,054, the only
independent claim at issue in the case, reads as follows:
1. The inventory control and reporting system, comprising: a data input device
for manual operation by an attendant, the input device having switch means
operable to encode information relating to sequential transactions, each of the
transactions having articles associated therewith, said information including
transaction identity and descriptions of each of said articles associated with
the transactions;
a data processor including memory operable to record said information and
means to maintain an inventory total, said data processor having means to as-
sociate sequential transactions with unique sequential indicia and to generate
at least one report of said total and said transactions, the unique sequential in-
dicia and the descriptions of articles in the sequential transactions being
reconcilable against one another;
a dot matrix printer operable under control of the data processor to generate a
written record of the indicia associated with sequential transactions, the writ-
ten record including optically-detectable bar codes having a series of
contrasting spaced bands, the bar codes being printed only in coincidence with
each said transaction and at least part of the written record bearing a portion to
be attached to said articles; and,
at least one optical scanner connected to the data processor and operable to de-
tect said bar codes on all articles passing a predetermined station,
whereby said system can detect and localize spurious additions to inventory as
well as spurious deletions therefrom.
Id. at 972 (emphasis in opinion).
54. Id. at 972-73.
55. Id. at 975.
56. Id. at 973 (quoting excerpts from the jury instructions).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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appealed, arguing that it was not only proper for the jury to interpret the
patent claims, but it was required under Federal Circuit precedent. 60
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court's directed ver-
dict of non-infringement, summarizing its rationale as follows at the
outset of the majority opinion:
We affirm the judgment of noninfringement. In doing so, we
conclude that the interpretation and construction of the patent
claims, which define the scope of the patentee's rights under the• 61
patent, is a matter of law exclusively for the court.
While acknowledging that past Federal Circuit precedent "contained
some inconsistent statements as to whether and to what extent claim
construction is a legal or factual issue, or a mixed issue "'62 the majority
concluded that the Federal Circuit had initially taken the position that
claim construction is a matter of law, and that any later Federal Circuit
cases which had taken a contrary view were lacking in "authoritative
support. '63 The majority opinion went on to state that "the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the construction of a patent claim is a
matter of law exclusively for the court," string citing, without quotation,
Supreme Court cases from 1848 through 1904.64
The Federal Circuit's majority opinion in Markman states, as the ba-
sis for its holding, that "[tihe patent is a fully integrated written
instrument," and is "uniquely suited for having its meaning and scope
determined entirely by a court as a matter of law,, 65 based on the follow-
ing principle:
The reason that the courts construe patent claims as a matter of
law and should not give such task to the jury as a factual matter
60. Id. at 973-74. The patent owner, Markman, cited Polumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762
F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985) for the proposition that when the meaning of a term in a patent
claim is disputed, it presents a factual question. Markman, 52 F3d at 973-74. Markman also
cited Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546,
1550-52 (Fed. Cir. 1991) for the proposition that a jury's claim construction should be given
deference. Markman, 52 F3d at 974.
61. Markman, 52 F.3d at 970-71 (emphasis added). The majority opinion was written
by Chief Judge Archer, and joined by Judges Rich, Nies, Michel, Plager, Lourie, Clevenger
and Schall. Judges Mayer and Rader filed opinions concurring in the judgment but not adopt-
ing the majority position that claim construction "is a matter of law exclusively for the judge."
Judge Mayer decried the treatment of the Seventh Amendment by the majority, id. at 989, and
Judge Rader strongly chided the majority for reaching the issue of "[w]hether claim construc-
tion can involve subsidiary facts" on the basis that the issue was not properly before the court,
id. at 998. Judge Newman dissented on the basis of the majority's failure to properly apply the
Seventh Amendment. Id. at 999-1026.
62. Id. at 976.
63. Id. at 976-77.
64. Id. at 977-78.
65. Id. at 978.
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is straight forward: It has long been and continues to be a fun-
damental principle of American law that "the construction of a
written evidence is exclusively with the Court."'
The Federal Circuit's majority opinion in Markman also cites policy
considerations. The majority opinion states that it is appropriate for the
Court to construe patent claims since the construction is "defining the
federal legal rights created by the patent document.' 67 Moreover, the ma-
jority cites certainty and uniformity as policies that would be served by
having the court construe patent claims as a matter of law. 6 The court
concludes the discussion as follows:
We therefore settle inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that
in a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to
construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the
patent claims .... Because claim construction is a matter of law,
the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal. 
69
It is highly significant that in the analysis leading up to the conclu-
sion that claim construction is a matter of law for the court, the majority
opinion of the Federal Circuit does not discuss, or even mention, the
Seventh Amendment, ° despite the fact that the issue on appeal pertained
to whether a judge or jury should construe patent claims. Rather, the ma-
jority of the Federal Circuit defines its task in Markman as follows: "we
must distinguish law from fact."7' The majority opinion only discusses
the Seventh Amendment as rebuttal72 to the dissenting 73 and one of the
66. Id. (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 978-79. The Federal Circuit stated in its majority opinion that "it is only fair
(and statutorily required) that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope
of the patentee's right to exclude," and further that:
Moreover, competitors should be able to rest assured, if infringement litigation oc-
curs, that a judge, trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the patent and
its associated public record and apply the established rules of construction, and in
that way arrive at the true and consistent scope of the patent owner's rights to be
given legal effect.
Id. at 979. The Federal Circuit also stated that "[airriving at a true and consistent scope of the
claims also works to the benefit of the patentee." Id.
69. Id. at 979.
70. See id. at 970-79; see also supra note 12 (for the relevant text of the Seventh
Amendment).
71. Markman, 52 F3d at 976.
72. Id. at 984 ("Yet the dissenting and one of the concurring opinions assert that our
decision violates the Seventh Amendment. A close analysis of the bases underlying their ar-
guments reveals, however, that they are unsupported by logic and precedent.").
73. Id. at 999-1026 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman painstakingly enumer-
ated her reasons for disagreeing with the majority's "new rule" that claim construction is a
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concurring opinions74 in the case. In its rebuttal, the majority acknowl-
edged that under the Seventh Amendment, the right to a jury trial exists
if an action "could be tried to a jury in 1791,' or if it is a statutory cause
of action "analogous to common law actions."" However, the majority
stated that its holding "do[es] not deprive parties of their right to a jury
matter of law solely for the court. Id. at 1000. Judge Newman pointed out that the "meaning
and scope of the technologic terms and words of art used to define patented invention" are
frequently in dispute and that the resolution of such disputes involves "the weight, credibility,
and probative value of conflicting evidence." Id. at 999. While agreeing with the majority that
the construction of patent claims is a matter of law, Judge Newman rejected the majority's
position that there are no underlying facts in claim construction, stating that "findings do not
become rules of law because they relate to a document whose legal effect follows from the
found facts." Id. at 1000-02. Judge Newman also decried the procedural infirmities which she
envisioned would arise as far as trial and appellate roles are concerned in patent infringement
suits. Id. at 999, 1002-08. She pointed out that the majority rule "does indeed serve to replace
the trier of fact with the Federal Circuit," id. at 1003, and replaces "a live trial with cold
documents" id. at 1006, a situation she doubted would improve the "quality of the decision,"
id. at 1003.
Judge Newman reserved her strongest criticism of the majority rule for the Seventh
Amendment issues raised:
Jury trial in patent cases is protected by the Seventh Amendment. Elimination of the
jury is not this Court's choice to make.
The constitutional right alone bars the majority's new rule. The majority today de-
nies 200 years of jury trial of patent cases in the United States, preceded by over
150 years of jury trail of patent cases in England, by simply calling a question of
fact a question of law. The Seventh Amendment is not so readily circumvented.
Id. at 1000. See also id. at 1010-17.
74. Id. at 989-98 (Mayer, C.J., concurring). Judge Mayer wrote an opinion which con-
curred in the judgment but empathetically rejected and vehemently criticized the majority's
holding that claim construction is a matter of law solely for the court. Judge Mayer predicted
that the majority's holding "portends turbulence and cynicism in patent litigation," id. at 989,
by "fl[ying] in the face of the constitutional right to a jury promised by the Seventh Amend-
ment of the Constitution' id. at 992. Reviewing and discussing Federal Circuit precedent, id.
at 989-90, Judge Mayer concluded that the majority's pronouncements on claim construction
represented a reversal of position:
So it is remarkable that the court so casually changes its collective mind, especially
when the just cited precedent [by Judge Mayer] was compelled by the Seventh
Amendment and not the mere preference of a sufficient number of judges. The
court's revisionist reading of precedent to loose claim interpretation from its factual
foundations will have profoundly negative consequences for the well-established
roles of trial judges, juries, and our court in patent cases.
Id. at 990 (footnote omitted). Judge Mayer also carefully discussed Supreme Court precedent,
concluding that the opinions of the highest court also supported a jury role in deciding any
"real factual dispute" that might be raised by extrinsic evidence in claim construction. Id. at
993-96. Judge Mayer blamed the majority's position concerning claim construction on the
outcome of a "hellbent" campaign to eliminate juries from patent cases, stating that "[tihe
quest to free patent litigation from the 'unpredictability' of jury verdicts, and generalist judges,
results from insular dogmatism inspired by unwarrantable elitism; it is unconstitutional." Id. at
989-90.
75. Id. at 984.
Appellate Review of Patent Claim Construction
trial in patent infringement cases," but "merely holds that part of the in-
fringement inquiry, construing and determining the scope of the claims
in a patent, is strictly a legal question for the court."76
In other sections of its rebuttal, the majority of the Federal Circuit
rejected the argument of the dissent and one of the concurring opinions
that claim construction in patents should be analogized to construing
contracts, deeds and wills, which are matters of law but may involve un-
derlying issues of fact.77 The majority stated that patents, unlike
contracts, are not executory in nature or discretionary in their issuance,
and always involve a transaction with the federal government rather than
any other entity."' The majority further stated that with respect to patents,
"[p]arol or other extrinsic evidence cannot add, subtract, or vary the
limitations of the claims," in contrast to some contract cases in which the
parol evidence rule does not apply and evidence is offered to show that a
contract does not reflect the agreement or intent of the parties. 9 In addi-
tion, the majority rejected an analogy to the factual inquiry involved in
76. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In the omitted footnote, the majority
pointed out that the de novo standard of review for claim construction applied in both jury and
bench trials. Id. at 984 n. 13. The majority also noted that, while the jury should not play a role
in claim construction under its analysis, the jury would still be involved in "the application of
the properly construed claim to the accused device." Id. at 984.
77. Compare id. at 984-87 (Archer, C.J., writing for majority and rejecting argument
that claim construction should be analogized to the interpretation of contracts, deeds and
wills), with id. at 997-98 (Mayer, J., concurring in judgment but rejecting majority view that
claim construction is a matter of law solely for the judge; drawing instead an analogy between
construction of patent claims and interpretation of contracts and deeds which may have under-
lying questions of fact), and id. at 1007 (Newman, J., dissenting and referring with approval to
the treatment of disputes concerning the meaning of technical terms as fact issues for a trier of
fact in contract cases).
78. Id. at 985 n.14. As a result, the majority points out that infringement suits are not
actions for breach of contract. Id. at 985.
79. Id. The author notes that what is meant by "varying" the limitation of a claim
through extrinsic evidence is a circular and amorphous concept if the meaning of the claim
limitation is in fact determined in the claim construction, which the majority acknowledges
may properly involve extrinsic evidence. See id. at 981. The internal strain in this position
taken by the majority accounts for what appears to be tortured reasoning in the following
majority statement:
Through this process of construing claims by, among other things, using certain ex-
trinsic evidence that the court finds helpful and rejecting other evidence as
unhelpful, and resolving disputes en route to pronouncing the meaning of claim
language as a matter of law based on the patent documents themselves, the court is
not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary
findings. Rather, the court is looking to the extrinsic evidence to assist in its con-
struction of the written document, a task it is required to perform. The district
court's claim construction, enlightened by such extrinsic evidence as may be help-
ful, is still based upon the patent and prosecution history. It is therefore still
construction, and is a matter of law subject to de novo review.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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contract law when there is an ambiguous term in the contract.8s The ma-
jority stated that, unlike such contract interpretation situations where the
inquiry revolves around the subjective intent of the parties, the subjective
intent of the patentee "is of little or no probative weight in determining
the scope of a claim (except as documented in the prosecution his-
tory);"'" "[r]ather the focus is on the objective test of what one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have under-
stood the term to mean." 2 With respect to this later inquiry, the majority
essentially denied the possibility of ambiguity in patent claims, relying
for support on statutory requirements for disclosure and definite claims
in patent applications, as well as the expertise of patent examiners.83 The
majority concluded that, with respect to patents, "[i]t is not ambiguity in
the document that creates the need for extrinsic evidence but rather un-
familiarity of the court with the terminology of the art to which the
patent is addressed."' The majority considered an analogy to statutory
interpretation more appropriate than an analogy to contract interpreta-
81tion.
80. Id. at 985-87.
81. Id. at 985.
82. Id. at 986.
83. Id. The majority refers to the disclosure provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to support its
position that the requirements for obtaining a patent result in "the avoidance of the kind of
ambiguity that allows introduction of extrinsic evidence in the contract law analogy," specifi-
cally stating as follows:
Moreover, ideally there should be no "ambiguity" in claim language to one of ordi-
nary shall in the art that would require resort to evidence outside the specification
and prosecution history. Section 112 of Title 35 requires that specifications "contain
a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same... " and requires that the specification "shall conclude with one
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."
Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 with emphasis added by Archer, C.J., writing for the majority).
The majority also discusses the expertise of patent examiners who review patent applica-
tions for the PTO as "quasi-judicial officials trained in the law," who possess expertise and
familiarity with "the level of skill in the art," and "whose duty it is to issue only valid patents."
Id. (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1984)). Based on the patent examiner's expertise, the majority stated that "[i]f the patent
claims are sufficiently unambiguous for the PTO, there should exist no factual ambiguity
when those same claims are later construed by a court of law in an infringement action." Id. at
986.
84. Id. at 986. By discussing claims that "ideally" contain no ambiguities, and situa-
tions in which there "should exist no factual ambiguity' the majority seems to imply by
comparison, while not expressly admitting it, that ambiguities in claim language could theo-
retically exist. Id. However, by not expressly admitting the possibility of ambiguity in claim
language, the majority does not resolve the potential problem.
85. Id. at 987.
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Certiorari was granted, and the Supreme Court issued a unanimous
opinion, affirming the decision of the Federal Circuit.'
In sharp contrast to the general approach taken by the Federal Cir-
cuit in its majority Markman opinion, the Supreme Court began its
decision by raising the Seventh Amendment issue, stating as follows:
The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called
patent claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the
scope of the patentee's rights, is a matter of law reserved entirely
for the court, or subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that
a jury will determine the meaning of any disputed term of art
about which expert testimony is offered.87
Next, in terms that differed markedly from those employed by the Fed-
eral Circuit, the Supreme Court stated its ultimate holding as follows:
"[w]e hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of art within
its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court. '88 After briefly
discussing the constitutional origin of patent protection, the long stand-
ing requirement that a patent "describe the exact scope of an invention
and its manufacture," and the "specification" and "claims" in modem
American patents, the Court pointed out that patent claims serve to de-
fine the scope of patent rights and must be interpreted in patent
infringement lawsuits.89
The Supreme Court analysis of the issue it faced began with the tra-
ditional "historical test" under its Seventh Amendment precedent:
[W]e ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action
that either was tried at law at the time of the founding [when the
Seventh Amendment was adopted] or is at least analogous to one
that was .... If the action in question belongs in the law cate-
gory, we then ask whether the particular trial decision must fall
to the jury in order to preserve the substance of this common-
law right as it existed in 1791.90
Under the first part of the test, the Court concluded that "there is no dis-
pute that infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their
86. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
87. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 372-74. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court does not regard the require-
ment that patents set forth the "exact scope of an invention" as based in modem claiming
practice, but instead recognizes the requirement as a long standing one. Id. at 373 ("It has long
been understood that a patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufac-
ture to 'secure to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what
is still open to them.'" (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419,424 (1891)).
90. Id. at 376 (citation omitted).
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predecessors were more than two centuries ago. 9 However, the applica-
tion of the second part of the historical test was far less easy for the Court.
In assessing "whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial
(here, the construction of a patent claim) is itself necessarily a jury is-
sue," the second part of the historical test, the Court considered historical
evidence but found that "the old practice provides no clear answer."9
The Supreme Court therefore had to determine, according to precedent,
whether the jury must construe patent claims, and in particular, disputed
terms of art within the patent claims, in order "to preserve the 'substance
of the common-law right of trial by jury."' 93 The Court noted that the
standard is "a pretty blunt instrument for drawing distinctions," and
pointed out that the Court had "tried to sharpen it, to be sure, by refer-
ence to the distinction between substance and procedure," and had "also
spoken of the line as one between issues of fact and law."94 However, it is
extremely significant that, given the issue at hand, the Court did not
choose the approach of trying to draw a line between fact and law. In-
stead, labeling claim construction a "mongrel practice," the Court chose
the historical approach for the second part of the test (in effect, a nested
historical approach):
But the sounder course, when available, is to classify a mongrel
practice (like construing a term of art following receipt of evi-
dence) by using the historical method, much as we do in
characterizing the suits and actions within which they arise.
Where there is no exact antecedent, the best hope lies in compar-
ing the modem practice to earlier ones whose allocation to court
or jury we do know.9
Applying the historical approach to the second question, the Court found
"no direct antecedent of modem claim construction in the historical
sources," but considered some cases involving the construction of patent
specifications as the closest analogy at the time relevant to the Seventh
Amendment analysis.96 For those cases, however, the Court found that
91. Id. at 377.
92. Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987)).
94. Id. at 378.
95. Id. (emphasis added). Since the term "mongrel practice" appears in the opinion
followed immediately after the statement "[w]e have also spoken of the line as one between
issues of fact and law," it seems clear that the court intended the term "mongrel practice" to
refer to a mixed question of fact and law.
96. Id. at 378-79.
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none established that construction of disputed terms in patent specifica-
tions was an issue for the jury.97
Finding that the "evidence of common-law practice at the time of the
framing does not entail application of the Seventh Amendment's jury
guarantee to the construction of the claim document," the Court consid-
ered existing precedent, the "relative interpretative skills of judges and
juries," and statutory policies." Reviewing both Supreme Court prece-
dent and treatises, the Court concluded that these authorities did not
indicate "that juries resolved the meaning of terms of art in construing a
patent," but instead supported having the court construe patent claims.99
The Court also found that "functional considerations" weighed in favor
of having a judge, rather than a jury, define terms of art within the patent
claims, stating:
[WIhen an issue "falls somewhere between a pristine legal stan-
dard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at
times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the
sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better posi-
tioned than another to decide the issue in question."'' °
The Court supported its determination that judges are likely to be better
at construing patent claims than jurors, on the basis that judges fre-
quently construe written instruments, have special training and are
therefore more likely to reach "a proper interpretation."'' The Court also
dismissed the argument that the jury should be involved in claim con-
struction to evaluate witness credibility, expressing doubt that many
patent cases would turn on credibility judgments concerning conflicting
expert testimony."2
97. Id. at 379-84. The Supreme Court discussed the "primitive state of jury patent prac-
tice at the end of the 18th century," and the lack of clear statements of law in patent cases,
leading early commentators to lament what the Supreme Court characterized as "patent law's
amorphous character." Id. at 380-81. The Court refused to imply that juries must have con-
strued claims in reaching documented verdicts, finding it more likely that the judge interpreted
the patent documents: "There is no more reason to infer that juries supplied plenary interpreta-
tion of written instruments in patent litigation than in other cases implicating the meaning of
documentary terms, and we do know that in other kinds of cases during this period judges, not
juries, ordinarily construed written documents." Id. at 381-82.
98. Id. at 384.
99. Id. at 384-88.
100. Id. at 388-90 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (emphasis
added)).
101. Id. at 388-89.
102. Id. at 389. The Supreme Court stated that "[i]n the main, we expect any credibility
determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole
document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way
that comports with the instrument as a whole." In its discussion of the issue, however, the
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The last consideration the Court addressed was the importance of
providing "uniformity" in the treatment of patents, a policy issue which
the Court cited as an "independent reason to allocate all issues of con-
struction to the court."'0 3 The Court stated that "treating interpretive
issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) intra-
jurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on those
questions not yet subject to inter-jurisdictional uniformity under the au-
thority of the single appeals court."''°
In considering factors beyond the traditional historical test, the Court
expressly stated that it was not applying a fact/law test:
Because we conclude that our precedent supports classifying the
question as one for the court, we need not decide either the ex-
tent to which the Seventh Amendment can be said to have
crystallized a law/fact distinction, or whether post-1791 prece-
dent classifying an issue as one of fact would trigger the
protections of the Seventh Amendment if (unlike this case) then
were no more specific reason for decision.' 5
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Markman, it is telling to compare, side by side, the rationales of
both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court in their Markman deci-
sions. While the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Federal
Circuit, an in-depth review of the opinions of the two courts confirms
that, in large part, the two Markman opinions are like ships passing in
the night. They differ in their general approaches, the scope of their
holdings, and their analyses.
First, the two decisions employ wholly different approaches. While
the Federal Circuit stated as its task: "we must distinguish law from
Court did recognize that a case could arise in which a credibility judgment would be the de-
termining factor in resolving conflicting testimony.
It is of course true that credibility judgments have to be made about the experts who
testify in patent cases, and in theory there could be a case in which a simple credi-
bility judgment would suffice to choose between experts whose testimony was
equally consistent with a patent's internal logic. But our own experience with
document construction leaves us doubtful that trial courts will run into many cases
like that.
Id. The Court concluded that "there is sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of art like
many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial, notwithstand-
ing its evidentiary underpinnings." Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 390.
104. Id. at 391.
105. Id. at 384 n. 10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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fact,"'06 the Supreme Court identified the issue in terms of the Seventh
Amendment: "[t]he question here is whether the interpretation of a so-
called patent-claim... is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court,
or subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee .. The Supreme
Court embarked on a detailed Seventh Amendment analysis in its deci-
sion, beginning with the traditional "historical approach," and
considering whether juries should construe patent claims in order "to
preserve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.""' On
the other hand, the Federal Circuit did not even mention the Seventh
Amendment in its initial law versus fact approach, and only discussed
the Seventh Amendment as rebuttal to the dissenting and one of the con-
curring opinions of two Federal Circuit •u
Second, the two decisions reached conclusions that differ in scope.
The specific word choices employed in the Federal Circuit and Supreme
Court Markman decisions, including the statements of the holdings,
demonstrate a decided mismatch. The Federal Circuit's Markman deci-
sion repeatedly states that claim construction is "a matter of law
exclusively for the court," and that, as a result, it is "reviewed de novo on
appeal.""0 On the other hand, even though the wording of the Federal
Circuit's Markman decision included repeated enticements to address the
"matter of law" language, the decision of the Supreme Court, having
avoided tests based upon the "law/fact distinction,""' does not include
any statement in its holding defining claim construction as falling into
the category of "matters of law." The Supreme Court's conclusion,
rather, is that "construction of a patent, including terms of art within its
claim, is exclusively within the province of the court." 2 This wording of
the holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's labeling of claim
construction as a "mongrel practice," better analyzed under a historical
approach rather than "one between issues of fact and law."
The Supreme Court also carefully avoided any language relating to
the standard of review on appeal. It is noteworthy that the Supreme
Court restated the holding of the Federal Circuit to exclude any reference
to a "matter of law" categorization. According to the Supreme Court:
"The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed,
holding the interpretation of claim terms to be the exclusive province of
106. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc); see also supra text accompanying note 74.
107. Markman, 517 U.S. at 372; see also supra text accompanying note 90.
108. See supra notes 90, 93.
109. See supra notes 70, 72-74 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 61, 69 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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the court and the Seventh Amendment to be consistent with that conclu-
sion."' 3 In rephrasing the conclusion of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme
Court limited the scope of its review and decision to whether a judge or
jury should construe claims, and did not address the standard of review
on appeal of patent claim construction decisions.
Finally, the Markman decisions of the Federal Circuit and the Su-
preme Court employ entirely divergent in-depth analyses. The Federal
Circuit employed a law versus fact approach, outside of any Seventh
Amendment context, in reaching its conclusion that claim construction is
"a matter of law exclusively for the court," and it overruled past contrary
Federal Circuit precedent.' 4 The Federal Circuit's Markman analysis
relied heavily upon the reasoning that "[t]he patent is a fully integrated
written instrument," and is "uniquely suited for having its meaning and
scope determined entirely by a court as a matter of law.""' The Federal
Circuit addressed the Seventh Amendment in rebuttal, remarking that the
Federal Circuit holding does not deprive patent litigants of a right to a
jury trial, but "merely holds that part of the infringement inquiry, con-
struing and determining the scope of the claims in a patent, is a strictly
legal question for the court."" 6 In sharp contrast, the Supreme Court un-
dertook an in-depth analysis of the Seventh Amendment as it pertains to
patent cases in its Markman decision. Applying the traditional "historical
approach," the Supreme Court first concluded that patent infringement
cases fall within the scope of protection of the Seventh Amendment and
"must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centu-
ries ago." "' In determining whether the particular issue of claim
construction within a patent infringement lawsuit raises any jury issues
protected by the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court mentioned and
passed over a fact versus law framework for the analysis of the subsidi-
ary question of whether claim construction should involve the jury in
order "to preserve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by
jury.'18 The Court did so on the grounds that claim construction based
on the receipt of evidence is a "mongrel practice." Instead of employing
a fact versus law framework, the Supreme Court again applied a histori-
cal approach, and when that proved inconclusive in establishing Seventh
Amendment protection for claim construction, the Court considered its
existing precedent, the relative skills of judges and juries, and policy
113. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (emphasis
added).
114. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 93-95, 105 and accompanying text.
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considerations, again passing over and, in fact, expressly rejecting an
approach based on a "law/fact distinction."" 9
In the final portion of its decision, the Supreme Court addressed the
policy of providing "uniformity" as an "independent reason" for having
judges, rather than juries, construe claims. Stating that the limits of a
patent must be known so that others will not be discouraged from inven-
tion due to uncertainty regarding infringement, and so that the public
will ultimately get the benefit of the patent, the Supreme Court placed
great weight on uniformity.'2" The Supreme Court cited the desire of
Congress to further uniformity in patent law by creating the Federal Cir-
cuit. " ' Stating that such uniformity would be "ill served by submitting
issues of document construction to juries,' 2 even though issue preclu-
sion would apply in such a situation, the Supreme Court relied upon
stare decisis as a way to attempt to foster uniformity in claim construc-
tion:
But whereas issue preclusion could not be asserted against new
and independent infringement defendants even within a given ju-
risdiction, treating interpretive issues as purely legal will
promote (though it will not guarantee) intra-jurisdictional cer-
tainty through the application of stare decisis on those questions
not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the author-
ity of the single appeals court.
2 3
The above quoted language, in the penultimate paragraph of the de-
cision, has been relied upon to support the view that the Supreme Court
did, in effect, take the position that claim construction is a matter of law
and has no underlying factual issues, and that Cybor cannot be overruled
by the Federal Circuit.'2 4 This language has certainly created some
119. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
120, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 391.
123. Id.
124. See Krinsky, supra note 14. While arguing that deference should be given to "fac-
tual findings and acquired technical expertise" inherent in district court claim construction
rulings, Mr. Krinsky states that commentary by judges and scholars that the Federal Circuit
should change the standard of review of claim construction rulings is based on "a flawed as-
sumption."
This commentary relies on a flawed assumption. The Federal Circuit lacks the au-
thority to review claim construction rulings deferentially, because de novo review is
required by the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
In particular, the Supreme Court stated that claim construction rulings are entitled
to stare decisis.
Id. at 194.
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internal tension in the decision. The majority of the Federal Circuit in
Cybor chose to read the Supreme Court's Markman decision as affirm-
ing the rationale of the Federal Circuit's Markman decision, and thus
reaffirmed, in Cybor, the statements in the Federal Circuit's Markman
decision that claim construction is a purely legal issue subject to de novo
review on appeal. Other judges on the Federal Circuit vehemently dis-
agreed with this reading of the Supreme Court's Markman decision.1
2
1
The dissent of Justice Newman and the concurrence by Judge Mayer
in the Federal Circuit's Markman decision are correct in their criticism
of the majority's position that claim construction is a matter of law with
no possible factual component.' 26 Further, the concurrence of Judge
Mayer, the opinion of Judge Rader dissenting in part, joining in part and
concurring in the judgement, and the "additional views" of Judge New-
man in Cybor are correct in criticizing the Cybor majority for
interpreting the Supreme Court's Markman decision as holding that
claim construction is purely a matter of law.' 27 It is important to reiterate
that the Supreme Court expressly rejected the law versus fact approach in
applying the Seventh Amendment in its decision. The Supreme Court
also labeled claim construction in a straightforward manner as a "mon-
grel practice."'' 28 By comparison, the Supreme Court used the term
"treating" when it discussed the policy position that stare decisis would
advance uniformity in claim construction by "treating interpretive issues
as purely legal." 29 As those engaged in patent claim construction are
acutely aware, word choices matter. To conclude that the penultimate
paragraph can be used to negate the earlier statements in the Seventh
Amendment analysis would be similar to turning the statements on their
heads, as Lewis Carroll did in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland: "you
might just as well say... that 'I breath when I sleep' is the same thing as
'I sleep when I breath!' ,,130
Based upon a fair and careful reading of these decisions, it is not
principled to conclude that the Supreme Court's Markman decision af-
firmed the rationale of the Federal Circuit's Markman decision that
claim construction is in the exclusive province of the court because it
constitutes in its entirety a matter of law, devoid of any underlying ques-
tions of fact. The principled conclusion is that while the Supreme Court
affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision that a judge, rather than a jury,
125. See supra notes 44-45, 48-50 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 44-45, 48-50 and accompanying text.
128. Markman, 517 U.S. at 378.
129. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
130. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 56 (Borders Classics
2008) (1865).
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should construe the claims of a patent, it did so based upon a Seventh
Amendment analysis. The Supreme Court expressly declined to employ
a fact versus law analysis in applying the Seventh Amendment, and la-
beled claim construction a "mongrel practice" in the context of a fact
and law discussion. The Supreme Court's rationale in Markman differed
from that of the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit's Cybor decision,
which relies upon the Federal Circuit's Markman decision, is rooted en-
tirely in its fact versus law analysis and cannot be reconciled in a
principled manner with the Supreme Court's rationale in Markman.
However, since the Supreme Court did introduce some internal ten-
sion in the penultimate paragraph of its Markman decision, which has
led to disagreement among judges, practitioners and scholars concerning
the Supreme Court's rationale, it is worthwhile to compare the Supreme
Court's approach in Markman with other Seventh Amendment cases.
B. Markman and the Supreme Court's General Seventh Amendment Law
In its Markman decision, the Supreme Court analyzed the Seventh
Amendment issue under the so-called "historical test," an approach that
the Court attributed to the era of Justice Story.' As previously discussed,
the test seeks to determine whether the action in question "could have
been brought in a court of law in 1791, the time of the Seventh Amend-
ment's ratification,"'32 and involves an inquiry into cases brought in the
courts of law in England at that time. The inquiry is largely rooted in the
historical distinction between actions at law and actions in equity, with
the right to a jury trial historically available for actions at law but not for
actions in equity.3 3 In appropriate cases, the inquiry also involves distin-
guishing actions at law from actions historically brought in admiralty,
T 4
an issue not involved in the Cybor or Markman cases.
Under the historical test, in order to qualify for Seventh Amendment
protection, the action at issue need not directly correlate to an action that
131. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (citing United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750
(C.C. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750)). The Court also cites a leading constitutional scholar, Charles
Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640-
43 (1973).
132. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Sev-
enth Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 183, 187-88 (2000). Moses
places the time of the development of the historical test for the Seventh Amendment in the
twentieth century, relying upon Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657
(1935).
133. See generally James Fleming, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE
L.J. 655 (1963).
134. See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830) (The Supreme Court
stated as follows with respect to the phrase "common law" in the Seventh Amendment: "[tihe
phrase 'common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admi-
ralty, and maritime jurisprudence.").
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could have been brought in the courts of law in England in 1791. Rather,
the test considers whether the action at issue is analogous to an action
that could have been brought in a court of law in England in 1791 .35 As a
result, the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment may apply
to modem statutory causes of action.
36
The "historical test" has been continuously applied in Seventh
Amendment analyses since at least 1935, when the Supreme Court is-
sued its decision in Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,'37 but the
details, as well as the articulation, of the "historical test" have varied
somewhat over the years.'38 In the Redman case, the Supreme Court sim-
ply stated that under the Seventh Amendment, "[t]he right of trial by jury
thus preserved is the right which existed under the English common law
when the amendment was adopted."'3 9 In later cases, many of which in-
volved suits asserting modem statutory causes of action, the Supreme
Court stated that the historical test requires consideration of both (1) the
nature of the legal action at issue as compared to eighteenth century
English actions, and (2) the type of remedy sought.' 4 The cases have not
always been consistent in their view of which of these two factors is
135. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
136. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). In Curtis, a case under the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, the Supreme Court applied the Seventh Amendment and found that there was a
right to a jury trial, stating that the Seventh Amendment applies "to actions enforcing statutory
rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies,
enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Id. at 193-94. See also
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974).
137. Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc., 295 U.S. at 654.
138. See generally Moses, supra note 132, at 187-98.
139. Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc., 295 U.S. at 657.
140. See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194 ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions
enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal
rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.");
Pernell, 416 U.S. at 375 (The Seventh Amendment "requires trial by jury in actions unheard of
at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally
enforced in an action at law, rather than in an action in equity or admiralty."); Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). Referring to the Seventh Amendment, the Court
stated as follows: "The form of our analysis is familiar. 'First, we compare the statutory action
to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of
law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or
equitable in nature.'" Id. (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18).
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more important. "' However, the historical test has survived in general
form to the present day.'
Some of the Supreme Court cases involving the Seventh Amendment
historical test have applied the test separately to different issues within a
given case. In Ross v. Bernhard,' the Court considered whether there
were any issues within a stockholders derivative action that merited Sev-
enth Amendment protection, and held that "the right to jury trial attaches
to those issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation, if it had
been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury.'"4 The
Court stated in its analysis that "[t]he Seventh Amendment question de-
pends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of
the overall action."'
45
In Tull v. United States, a lawsuit initially brought by the government
seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief against a real estate devel-
oper for violating the Clean Water Act by dumping fill on wetlands, the
Supreme Court found that there was a right to trial by jury on the issue
of liability but not on the assessment of the civil penalties.'
6
The analysis differed from Ross v. Bernhard, however, in that the
Court did not separate out liability, on the one hand, and damages in the
form of a civil penalty, on the other, as two separate issues that each re-
quired separate analyses under the historical test. In fact, the Court
chastised the government for this type of argument:
The Government contends that both the cause of action and the
remedy must be legal in nature before the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial attaches. It divides the Clean Water Act ac-
tion for civil penalties into a cause of action and a remedy, and
141. Compare Granfinanciera, S.A., 492 U.S. at 42 (stating that the consideration of the
remedy sought is more important than comparing the statutory action to 18th-century actions
in England), with Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990) (split among the justices concerning the relative importance of historical analogues
based on the nature of the action and the remedy sought).
142. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348 (1998) (The Court con-
sidered "both the nature of the statutory action and the remedy sought" in applying the
historical test.).
143. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
144. Id. at 532-33.
145. Id. at 538 (footnote omitted). In the footnote to the statement quoted, the Court
stated that "the 'legal' nature of an issue" is determined by taking into account (1) whether the
issue was considered legal before the merger of law and equity, (2) the remedy sought and
(3) "the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. at 538 n. 10 (citing Fleming, supra note
133). Margaret Moses considers the footnote to be dicta and states that the Supreme Court
"never developed in any other case, however, a functional approach to Seventh Amendment
interpretation which considered 'the practical abilities and limitations of juries,' except with
respect to administrative proceedings." Moses, supra note 132, at 240.
146. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
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analyzes each component as if the other were irrelevant .... We
reject this novel approach. Our search is for a single historical
analog, taking into consideration the nature of the cause of ac-
tion and the remedy as two important factors."7
The government and Tull advanced different historical analogues, a pub-
lic nuisance action and an action in debt, respectfully. Based upon their
proposed analogies, the government argued that the nature of the cause
of action under the Clear Water Act was equitable, while Tull argued that
it was legal.'48 The Court found both analogies appropriate, but rather
than decide which was better, the Court stated that the relief sought was
the more important factor in the historical test. 49 Based upon this as-
sessment, the Court found that the nature of the relief sought in the form
of civil penalties was "traditionally available only in a court of law," and
there was therefore a jury trial right on liability under the Seventh
Amendment. 50
The Court in Tull then addressed the issue of whether there was a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury for the civil penalty assessment.
Finding that the legislative history of the 1977 Amendments to the Clean
Water Act indicated a legislative intent to have trial judges "perform the
highly discretionary calculation necessary to award civil penalties," the
Court stated that "[w]e must decide therefore whether Congress can,
consistent with the Seventh Amendment, authorize judges to assess civil
penalties."'5 ' The Court stated that the answer to the question "must de-
pend on whether the jury must shoulder this responsibility as necessary
to preserve the 'substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.' ,,152
The Court held that the assessment of penalties under the Clean Water
Act "cannot be said to involve the 'substance of a common-law right to a
trial by jury,' nor a 'fundamental element of a jury trial.' ,'3 Based on
this assessment, the Congressional intent and the "highly discretionary
calculations" that are necessary and of a kind "traditionally performed
by judges," the Court stated that "[w]e conclude that the Seventh
Amendment required that petitioner's demand for a jury trial be granted
147. Id. at 421 n.6 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 418-20.
149. Id. at 421-25.
150. Id. at 423.
151. Id. at 425.
152. Id. at 426 (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973)).
153. Id. (quoting Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157 and Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S.
372, 392 (1943)).
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to determine his liability, but that the trial court and not the jury should
determine the amount of penalty, if any."'1
5 4
The Supreme Court decision in Markman cites a number of Seventh
Amendment cases, and appears to place significant reliance on Tull.'55 In
Markman, the Court applied the historical test to the statutory cause of
action for patent infringement, and found with little discussion that "in-
fringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were
more than two centuries ago."' 5 6 Then, similar to Tull, the Court looked at
the "particular trial decision" of patent claim construction, in order to
determine if it must entail a jury trial right "in order to preserve the sub-
stance of the common-law right as it existed in 179l."' The Supreme
Court in Markman was unable to answer the question on the basis of
"historical evidence,'58 so the Court considered later precedent as well
as "the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries.' 59 The later con-
sideration is similar to the discussion in Tull of the "highly discretionary
calculations" that are "traditionally performed by judges.
' 6
Neither the Supreme Court's reliance upon Tull in Markman, nor
general Seventh Amendment law provide support for the Cybor ruling
that claim construction is a "purely legal question" and should therefore
be subject to de novo review on appeal.' 6' The analysis in Tull involved
distinguishing actions at law from actions at equity.62 The discussion of
the calculation of civil penalties in Tull refers to both legal and equitable
considerations.' 63 In the Supreme Court's Markman decision, the Seventh
Amendment references, particularly the Tull reference, support an infer-
ence that, while claim construction is left to the judge, the judge can find
facts, as necessary, and as judges normally do while exercising their eq-
uitable authority.' 6 This analysis does not lend support to the de novo
154. Id. at 426-27. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. The dissenting portion was based on the position that a jury should assess the
civil penalty.
It should also be noted that the decision in Tull that there is no right to a jury trial for the
civil penalty assessment has been described by the Supreme Court as being "in tension" with
other Supreme Court cases. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355
n.9 (1998).
155. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376-78 (1996).
156. Id. at 377.
157. Id. at 376.
158. Id. at 377-84.
159. Id. at 384-90.
160. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987).
161. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
162. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18.
163. Id. at 422-23.
164. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). This is also consistent with the statements in the Supreme
Court's Markman decision that if a particular claim construction involves "a question of mean-
ing peculiar to a trade or profession" and "the question is a subject of testimony requiring
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standard of review set forth in Cybor, which is based on a law versus fact
distinction rather than the law versus equity distinction which underlies
the historical approach to the Seventh Amendment.
C. Supreme Court Precedent Regarding Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), in an action tried by
the court "without a jury or with an advisory jury," the court is required
to "find the facts specifically and state its conclusions of law sepa-
rately."165 Such findings by the court are expressly subject to a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review "whether based on oral or other evi-
dence," and "the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."'
66
In Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp.,167 the United
States Supreme Court considered the applicability of Rule 52(a) in a pat-
ent case. In Dennison, the defendant had raised the defense that the
patents it was accused of infringing were invalid on the grounds of "ob-
viousness." '6' After reviewing the prior art introduced during the trial,
and identifying differences between the prior art and the asserted patents,
the trial judge concluded that the patents were invalid as obvious.' 69 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the trial court's assessment of
the prior art, among other things, and reversed the judgment of the trial
court. " The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's
argument that the Federal Circuit had not applied the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review required by Rule 52(a), but had substituted its view of
the facts instead.'
7'
In a short decision, the Supreme Court discussed patent validity and
obviousness, and noted that, based upon its own precedent, "'[w]hile the
ultimate question of patent validity is one of law,'" the determination of
obviousness or non-obviousness "'lends itself to several basic factual
credibility determinations," this situation "will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisti-
cated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term
can be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a whole." Markman, 517
U.S. at 389. According to the Supreme Court in Markman, such an analysis rests with the trial
judge: "[w]e accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of art
like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial, notwith-
standing its evidentiary underpinnings." Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
167. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated,
475 U.S. 809 (1986) (per curiam).
171. Dennison, 475 U.S. at 810.
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inquiries,"' which the Court enumerated.' The Court then stated that
"[t]his description of the obviousness inquiry makes it clear that whether
or not the ultimate question of obviousness is a question of fact subject
to Rule 52(a), the subsidiary determinations of the District Court, at the
least, ought to be subject to the Rule."'73 Since the Federal Circuit had
not mentioned Rule 52(a) in its decision, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment below and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit "for fur-
ther consideration in light of Rule 52(a).' ' 4
In the Dennison decision, the Supreme Court noted that it was dis-
advantaged in its review of the case by the absence of the Federal
Circuit's views on the applicability of Rule 52(a):
The Federal Circuit, however, did not mention Rule 52(a), did
not explicitly apply the clearly-erroneous standard to any of the
District Court's findings on obviousness, and did not explain
why, if it was of that view, Rule 52(a) had no applicability to this
issue. We therefore lack an adequate explanation of the basis for
the Court of Appeal's judgment: most importantly, we lack the
benefit of the Federal Circuit's informed opinion on the complex
issue of the degree to which the obviousness determination is
one of fact. In the absence of an opinion clearly setting forth the
views of the Court of Appeals on these matters, we are not pre-
pared to give plenary consideration to petitioner's claim that the
decision below cannot be squared with Rule 52(a).1
75
While the Supreme Court expressed a desire to obtain the Federal
Circuit's views on the "degree" to which an obviousness determination
implicates facts, it is clear that the Supreme Court held in Dennison that
Rule 52(a) is applicable to underlying questions of fact in a patent valid-
ity determination based upon obviousness. The holding is consistent
with the Court's decisions in Pullman-Standard v. Swint 7 6 and Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,' 7  that the "clearly er-
roneous" standard of review of Rule 52(a) applies broadly to findings of
fact.
Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport
172. Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
173. Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).
177. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984)
("Rule 52(a) applies to findings of fact, including those described as 'ultimate facts' because
they may determine the outcome of litigation.").
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to exclude certain categories of factual findings from the obliga-
tion of a court of appeals to accept a district court's findings
unless clearly erroneous. It does not divide facts into categories;
in particular, it does not divide findings of fact into those that
deal with "ultimate" and those that deal with "subsidiary"
facts. 7 '
In both its Markman and Cybor decisions, the majority of the Fed-
eral Circuit avoided the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) and
the related Supreme Court precedent by defining claim construction as a
"purely legal question,"'79 over vigorous dissents.'80 However, the Federal
Circuit's position that claim construction is "purely legal" is not princi-
pled as it conflicts with the Supreme Court's Markman analysis in the
Seventh Amendment context. As a result, the Federal Circuit's position,
expressed in both its Markman and Cybor decisions, that claim construc-
tion should be reviewed de novo represents an unprincipled run-around
Rule 52(a) and the Supreme Court's decision in Dennison.
Nevertheless, at least one scholar has suggested that the Supreme
Court may have intended in Dennison to afford the Federal Circuit con-
siderable discretion in deciding whether questions arising in patent cases
constitute questions of fact or law, particularly with regard to the stan-
dard of appellate review.' Therefore, it is instructive to inquire further.
Is the Federal Circuit's position in Markman and Cybor that claim con-
struction is "purely legal" in keeping with the Supreme Court's
expressed desire in Dennison to obtain the Federal Circuit's "informed
opinion" on a "complex issue" of the degree to which a patent law de-
termination may involve a factual component? 82 If so, how does that jibe
with the Seventh Amendment?
II. SHOULD THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DETERMINE THE FACT
VERSUS LAW DIVIDE IN PATENT MATTERS?
In the context of determining the appropriate standard of review on
appeal, the Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged that distin-
178. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287.
179. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
180. Markman, 52 F.3d at 989-1026; Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1462-81.
181. See Burgess, supra note 1, at 769-70. With respect to Dennison, Burgess states that
"the Supreme Court indicated that it might be receptive to an explanation that Rule 52(a)
somehow did not apply in that case... "). Id.
182. See Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (per curiam).
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guishing between issues of fact and law can be difficult.183 The Court has
referred to the "vexing nature" of the distinction, and has noted that Rule
52(a) fails to provide "particular guidance" with respect to the task.IM
Moreover, the Court has admitted "the practical truth that the decision to
label an issue a 'question of law,' a 'question of fact,' or a 'mixed ques-
tion of law and fact' is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is
of analysis.'
8
Should the Federal Circuit decide where the fact versus law divide
should be drawn in patent matters on the theory that the boundary is
really one of convenience?
A number of legal commentators have taken the position that the
terms "fact" and "law" cannot be adequately defined or distinguished.
Some have postulated that "fact" and "law" do not specify "different
kinds of entities," and that there is no "qualitative or ontological distinc-
tion between them," but only "pragmatic differences.', 86 It has been
argued that the terms are "equally expansible and collapsible" and that
they "readily accommodate themselves to any meaning we desire to give
them." 87 It has also been stated that "questions of fact" and "questions of
law" do not represent "two mutually exclusive kinds of questions, based
upon a difference of subject matter," and that drawing a line between
them is simply an "artificial cleavage" that is cut by the "knife of pol-
i .,,188
icy.,
The rationale set forth for the de novo standard of review for patent
claim construction in the Federal Circuit's Markman and Cybor deci-
sions appears to fall into the pragmatic school of thought. The
enunciated standard of review may be considered one of expediency,
based largely on policy considerations. The majority of the Federal Cir-
cuit in its en banc decision in Markman held that claim construction is
subject to de novo review on appeal because it is a "matter of law."'8 9
While the majority stated that a patent is a "fully integrated written in-
strument" and briefly cited precedent for the position that "the
construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the court" '90 to
183. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984);
Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944).
184. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501; Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.
185. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106(1985).
186. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2003).
187. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930).
188. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 55 (1927).
189. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
190. Id. at 978 (quoting Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) (Marshall,
C.J.)).
Spring 2009]
502 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:469
support its characterization of claim construction as a matter of law, the
majority relied heavily on the policy considerations of certainty and con-
sistency to support its holding. 9 ' The majority emphasized that it was
important to have a judge "trained in the law" undertake the claim con-
struction in order to "arrive at the true and consistent scope of the patent
owner's rights to be given legal effect."'92 This result would flow from a
characterization of claim construction as solely a matter of law, and
would in turn dictate de novo appellate review. Similarly, in its en banc
decision in Cybor, the majority of the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the de
novo standard of review and relied heavily on the policy of promoting
uniformity in claim constructions, quoting from the penultimate para-
graph in the Supreme Court's Markman decision:
[T]he [Supreme] Court expressly stated that "treating interpre-
tive issues as purely legal will promote (though not guarantee)
intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare de-
cisis on those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictiona
uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court."...
Indeed, the sentence demonstrates that the Supreme Court en-
dorsed this court's role in providing national uniformity to the
construction of a patent claim, a role that would be impeded if
we were bound to give deference to a trial judge's asserted fac-
tual determinations incident to claim construction.
9 3
In short, the de novo standard of review for claim construction theoreti-
cally allows the Federal Circuit to pursue uniform results in the
construction of any given patent claim.' 94 Moreover, the de novo standard
of review is simple and convenient. By defining all issues related to
claim construction as "matters of law" in its Markman and Cybor deci-
sions, the Federal Circuit in one fell swoop relegated patent trials, at
least in their claim construction aspects, to the level of advisory opin-
ions.
However, allowing the Federal Circuit to dictate where the division
between fact and law is drawn based upon convenience is not principled.
By defining any and all issues related to claim construction as "matters
of law," the Federal Circuit has indirectly held that the term "fact" in the
191. Id. at 978-79; see supra note 68.
192. Id. at 979.
193. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted) (third emphasis added).
194. In fact, one of the commentators who has espoused the position that there is no
"essential difference" between questions of law and questions of fact has stated that even the
Supreme Court's decision in Markman "provides yet another demonstration of the analytically
empty but pragmatically important concept of 'questions of law.'" Allen & Pardo, supra note
186, at 1784 (emphasis added).
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Seventh Amendment does not apply to any issue or underlying issue
relevant to claim construction. The Federal Circuit is, in effect, acting as
its own lexicographer with respect to the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment and its application to patent claim construction. Allowing
such latitude to the Federal Circuit runs afoul of Seventh Amendment
principles.
While a number of legal commentators have proposed the pragmatic
and arguably cynical view that there is no difference between issues of
"fact" and "law," there are other legal scholars who refute this position,
contending that there is an analytical distinction between such issues. 95
Professor Henry P. Monaghan has stated that the argument that the dis-
tinction between fact and law is "fundamentally incoherent" is itself
"greatly overdrawn."' 96 One of his major arguments, that the categories
of "fact" and "law" must have some distinction and meaning, rests in the
text of the United States Constitution.
Most important, they find expression in the constitutional text.
Article III invests Congress with power over the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction "both as to Law and Fact" and the
seventh amendment provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined ... than according to the rules of the
common law." Quite clearly, any analysis that purports to take
the constitutional text seriously must try to make some sense out
of these categories.""
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that draw-
ing the line between "fact" and "law" is a difficult and "vexing" task, the
Court has nevertheless emphasized the need to draw the distinction:
"[w]hat we have characterized as the 'vexing nature' of that distinction,
ibid., does not, however, diminish its importance, or the importance of
the principles that require the distinction to be drawn in certain cases."'9'
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court expressed a desire in the
Dennison case to obtain the Federal Circuit's "informed opinion" on a
"complex issue" of the degree to which a patent law determination may
involve a factual component,' 99 this should not be read as indicating that
the Federal Circuit's view would govern such a determination. Rather,
the Supreme Court has stated with respect to issues of fact and issues of
195. Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact
and Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 917-19 (1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 232-39 (1985).
196. Monaghan, supra note 195, at 233.
197. Id. at 233-34 (footnotes omitted).
198. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984).
199. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986).
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law that "[w]here the line is drawn varies according to the nature of the
substantive law at issue."'00 Therefore, it would be helpful to the Su-
preme Court, as is usually the case, to have the considered opinion of the
appellate court for consideration, particularly when the appellate court is
a specialized court. While a decision on the boundary between fact and
law needs to be made in the context of patent law, however, it is not a
question of patent law. It is a question of constitutional significance.
With respect to the standard of appellate review of patent claim con-
struction, the constitutional significance of the issue has been
highlighted by the Federal Circuit itself. In reaffirming and establishing
a de novo standard of appellate review, the Federal Circuit set forth a
rationale in Cybor that is inextricably tied into the rationale of its Mark-
man decision, which directly involved a Seventh Amendment issue. The
ultimate analysis of Seventh Amendment issues is a matter for the Su-
preme Court. Similarly, the ultimate determination regarding the fact
versus law divide, as far as it relates to the appellate standard of review
of patent claim construction, should rest with the Supreme Court and not
be left to the Federal Circuit.
Moreover, if the Supreme Court were to cede ultimate authority to
the Federal Circuit to draw the fact versus law distinction in a manner
that dictates de novo review of claim construction by the Federal Circuit,
the principles that underlie the proper functioning of the federal court
system would be upset. Congress has given the Federal Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction of appeals from cases in all trial courts if the jurisdiction of
the trial court was based, in whole or in part, on an asserted patent claim,
as well as exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from decisions of the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and interferences.20'
However, the decisions of the Federal Circuit are still subject to review
by the U.S. Supreme Court by statute.20
The Supreme Court, by failing to decide more Seventh Amendment
issues in the patent law context, and by turning down numerous petitions
for certiorari on the appropriate standard of appellate review for patent
claim construction,20 has arguably given too much deference to the Fed-
200. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501 n.17.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988); see Debra D. Peterson, Can This Brokered Marriage Be
Saved? The Changing Relationship Between the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit in Patent
Law Jurisprudence, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRoP. L. 201, 202 (2003) (stating that the
Federal Circuit was "never intended to be the de facto Supreme Court for patent issues").
203. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006), reh'g
denied, 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2270 (2007); Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006);
CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc, v. Tura LP, 120 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
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eral Circuit. The Federal Circuit, in turn, based upon its de novo review
of patent claim construction, gives the district courts no recognized def-
erence in this area.
As an intermediate appellate court, the Federal Circuit should define
and refine the law, subject to supervision by the Supreme Court, and
should supervise the trial courts in their application of the law.204 The
Supreme Court has stated that "independent appellate review of legal
issues best serves the dual goals of doctrinal coherence and economy of
judicial administration."2 5 On the other hand, the Supreme Court and
Congress have recognized that based upon "the respective institutional
advantages of trial and appellate courts," deference is due the trial courts
in ascertaining facts.26
In deference to the unchallenged superiority of the district
court's factfinding ability, Rule 52(a) commands that a trial
court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly er-
roneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. 2 7
Deferential review is also warranted for mixed questions of fact and
law "when it appears that the district court is 'better positioned' than the
appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate
scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.,
20 8
Ironically, one of the greatest obstacles in the path to achieving uni-
formity and clarity in the law of claim construction has been the
overwhelming desire of the Federal Circuit to get the "right" result in
any particular case. The federal court system operates by striving to
achieve the "right" results by applying the "right" institutional processes.
The Federal Circuit should not operate in an outcome determinative
manner to reach what it believes to be the "right" decision in individual
cases by applying rationales and rules that are expedient in the short run.
The Federal Circuit has been criticized for finding facts contrary to its
position as an appellate court,209 and this criticized practice has been
1039 (1998); Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1334 (1997).
204. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-33 (1991). "Courts of appeals, on
the other hand, are structurally suited to the collaborative juridical process that promotes deci-
sional accuracy. With the record having been constructed below and settled for purposes of the
appeal, appellate judges are able to devote their primary attention to legal issues." Id. at 232.
205. Id. at 231.
206. Id. at 233.
207. Id. See also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting).
208. Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 233 (citations omitted).
209. William C. Rooklidge & Mathew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Cir-
cuit's Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000).
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institutionalized in the area of claim construction by virtue of the de
novo standard of review. This has caused a breakdown in the hierarchy
and principled functioning of the appellate system in patent cases.
The district court judges, under the Supreme Court's Seventh
Amendment analysis in Markman, are more than capable of construing
patent claims by both finding facts as needed pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a), and applying the law of claim construction as an-
nounced by the Federal Circuit. When appropriate as a matter of law,
cases can and should be overturned and remanded by the Federal Circuit,
as is expected under our federal court system. Uniformity in the law is
more likely to prevail if the Federal Circuit adheres to its appropriate
obligations of "responsible appellate jurisdiction."2t
Therefore, in order to protect Seventh Amendment principles, and to
facilitate the proper functioning of the federal court system, the Federal
Circuit should not be the court that determines the ultimate boundary
between "fact" and "law" in patent cases for purposes of setting the
standard of appellate review of claim construction. The Federal Circuit
should not be its own lexicographer in this regard. Rather, it is ultimately
the responsibility of the Supreme Court to distinguish between "fact"
and "law," given the Seventh Amendment principles at stake, and the
appropriate standard of appellate review for patent claim construction
should take these principles into account.
III. EVALUATING PROPOSED STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Many patent law commentators have analyzed the issue of the ap-
propriate standard of appellate review of patent claim construction as if
it were essentially a practical problem in need of an expedient solution,
perhaps unconsciously accepting the position that there are no reliable
distinctions between "fact" and "law," other than those delineated by
policy considerations. There have been numerous articles written that
have addressed a perceived need to change the currently applied de novo
standard of review as a result of high reversal rates in patent cases due to
error assigned to patent claim constructions. "' Many, if not most, of
210. Salve Regina Coll., 499 U.S. at 231.
211. See, e.g., Krinsky, supra note 14. Krinsky cites the high reversal rate in patent
cases, id. at 194, and argues that deference should be given to the trial court's underlying fact-
finding in claim construction, "but only in the exceptional case where recourse to extrinsic
testimony is necessary and appropriate." Id. at 199. See also Burgess, supra note 1; Donald R.
Dunner, Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies: The Final Say on Appellate Review of Claim Con-
struction?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 481 (1998); M. Reed Staheli, Deserved
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these commentators take a pragmatic approach to solving the perceived
practical problems.2
A number of Federal Circuit judges have also cited practical prob-
lems that have resulted from the application of the de novo standard of
review as grounds for possible reconsideration of Cybor. In an order is-
sued three years ago in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., a
majority of the Federal Circuit judges denied a combined request for
either a panel rehearing or a rehearing en banc in a case which had been
reversed and remanded for error assigned to the claim construction."3 In
four separate dissents from the order, four of the Federal Circuit judges
stated that they were in favor of an en banc hearing in the case to recon-
sider the de novo standard of review reaffirmed in Cybor'14 Two of those
judges cited four specific "practical problems" that had arisen under the
de novo standard of review: (1) a high reversal rate, (2) a lack of predict-
ability in the appeals process, (3) a loss of the "comparative advantage
often enjoyed by the district court judges" who had heard and read the
evidence and may have spent considerable time on the claim construc-
tions, and (4) the burden on the Federal Circuit of construing claims "in
nearly every patent case."25 Another judge pointed out that, in general,
the de novo standard of review for claim construction had "not well
withstood the test of experience. 21 6 In fact, at this point, it appears that at
least half of the Federal Circuit judges are on the record as favoring a
reconsideration of Cybor's de novo standard of review. 7
Deference: Reconsidering the De Novo Standard of Review for Claim Construction, 3 MARQ.
INTELL. PRoP. L. REv. 181 (1999).
212. See Krinsky, supra note 14. Krinsky refers to deference being given "for policy
reasons," id. at 213, and states that "[t]he precise standard of review is less important than the
idea that some deference is due," id. at 203 n.41. See also Burgess, supra note 1, at 792 (Bur-
gess offers two different solutions to obtain the practical result sought: either "treat claim
construction as a mixed question of law and fact" or "leave Cybor as good law, but try to cabin
its effects by explaining its holding differently:'); Dunner, supra note 211, at 497 (Dunner
makes the practical argument that "[a]t the very least, it can be urged that functional consid-
erations recognized by the Supreme Court strongly favor according some deference in
reviewing a trial court's claim construction, particularly where the meaning of a claim turns on
evidence better adduced and evaluated at trial.").
213. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
214. Id. at 1040-41 (Michel, C.J., dissenting, joined by Rader, J.); id. at 1043 (Newman,
J., dissenting); id. at 1044-45 (Rader, J., dissenting); id. at 1046 (Moore, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 1040 (Michel, C., dissenting, joined by Rader, J.).
216. Id. at 1043 (Newman, J., dissenting).
217. The sixteen judges who are currently members of the Federal Circuit are Chief
Judge Michel, and Circuit Judges Friedman, Newman, Archer, Mayer, Plager, Lourie,
Clevenger, Rader, Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost, and Moore. United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Judicial Biographies, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
judgbios.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). At least eight of these judges have indicated either a
desire or a willingness to reconsider the de novo standard of review of patent claim construc-
tion. Chief Judge Michel stated in Amgen that "I believe the time has come for us to
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However, while a number of Federal Circuit judges, numerous aca-
demics, patent practitioners and even members of Congress have cited
significant practical problems that have resulted from the application of a
de novo standard of review to claim construction, there is no clear con-
sensus among critics of Cybor as to what degree of deference should be
given to a trial court's claim construction in patent cases.
There are a number of different views as to the appropriate standard
of appellate review of claim construction that have been expressed in
opinions by members of the Federal Circuit. While some of the judges
nominally adhere to a de novo standard of review in decisions, they have
expressed views that appear to embrace a more flexible standard of re-
view in which some undefined amount of deference is given to the trial
judge's claim construction.'" Some of the other judges have indicated
reexamine Cybor's no deference rule." Amgen, 469 F.3d at 1041 (Michel, C.J., dissenting,
joined by Rader, J.). Judges Newman and Rader have expressed their opposition to the de
novo standard of review. Id. at 1043 (Newman, J., dissenting); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Moore has stated that the court should reconsider de novo review. Id. at 1046
(Moore, J., dissenting). Judges Gajarsa, Linn and Dyk, while concurring in the denial of a
rehearing en banc in Amgen, stated as follows: "Our concurrence should not be read as an
endorsement of the panel's claim construction in this particular case, nor as an unqualified
endorsement of the en banc decision in Cybor. In an appropriate case we would be willing to
reconsider limited aspects of the Cybor decision." Id. at 1045 (Gajarsa, Linn and Dyk, JJ.,
concurring) (citation omitted). Judge Mayer wrote a scathing rebuke of the de novo standard
of review of patent claim construction in Phillips. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1330-35 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting).
218. Judge Lourie has stated that "even though claim construction is a question of law,
reviewable by this court without formal deference, I do believe that we ought to lean toward
affirmance of a claim construction in the absence of a strong conviction of error." Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1330 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As previously discussed,
Judge Plager supported a de novo standard of review in Cybor, but stated that "common sense
dictates that the trial judge's view will carry weight," although "[tihat weight may vary de-
pending on the care, as shown in the record, with which that view was developed, and the
information on which it is based." Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1465 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Plager, J., concurring); see supra note 47 and accompanying text. Judge
Bryson similarly supported the de novo standard of review in Cybor, but stated that although
the court considered claim construction an issue of law, that "does not mean that we intend to
disregard the work done by district courts in claim construction or that we will give no weight
to a district court's conclusion as to claim construction, no matter how the court may have
reached that conclusion." Cybor, 138 E3d at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring). As previously
discussed, Judge Bryson indicated in Cybor that when competing expert testimony is involved
in resolving a claim construction issue, it is appropriate "to factor into our legal analysis the
district court's superior access to one of the pertinent tools of construction." Id. See supra note
47 and accompanying text. Judge Bryson did not espouse the position that in such instances
there would be a factual issue at stake, but explained his position as follows:
That does not mean that we defer to a district court on legal matters unless we find
that the court has committed clear error with respect to an issue that should be char-
acterized as factual. What it means is that we approach the legal issue of claim
construction recognizing that with respect to certain aspects of the task, the district
court may be better situated than we are, and that as to those aspects we should be
cautious about substituting our judgment for that of the district court.
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that while they believe that no deference is due to a trial judge's interpre-
tation of the claim language, written description or prosecution history,
they would consider revising the de novo standard of review to possibly
afford some deference to the trial court in situations in which conflicting
expert testimony was weighed by the trial judge in determining the
meaning of a patent claim.19 Some of the judges have indicated that they
believe there are "factual determinations" involved in claim construction,
and have taken the position that "perhaps we should routinely give at
least some deference to the trial court, given its greater knowledge of the
facts" or make some "other adjustments to our current practice. ' 22 At
least two judges have not only taken the position that there are factual
issues involved in claim construction, but have also taken the position
that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), a clearly erroneous
standard of review should apply to such factual issues, including not
only matters of witness credibility but also "those findings of fact based
entirely on documentary evidence., 22' In a fairly recent decision of the
Federal Circuit, a panel applied the de novo standard of review but ex-
pressly noted that the outcome would have been the same under a clearly
erroneous standard.222
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring).
219. Judges Gajarsa, Linn and Dyk have expressed the following position:
In an appropriate case we would be willing to reconsider limited aspects of the Cy-
bor decision. In our view an appropriate case would be the atypical case in which
the language of the claims, the written description, and the prosecution history on
their face did not resolve the question of claim interpretation, and the district court
found it necessary to resolve conflicting expert evidence to interpret particular
claim terms in the field of the art.
Amgen, 469 F.3d at 1045 (Gajarsa, Linn and Dyk, JJ., concurring in the denial of the petition
for rehearing en banc).
220. Chief Judge Michel expressed these views in Amgen. Id. at 1041 (Michel, C.J.,
dissenting, joined by Rader, J.). Judge Rader stated that "I urge this court to accord deference
to the factual components of the lower court's claim construction." Id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dis-
senting).
221. Judges Mayer and Newman have supported this approach. See Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d at 1331-32 (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that "the
nature of the questions underlying claim construction illustrate that they are factual and should
be reviewed in accordance with Rule 52(a)," and pointing out that this deference should apply
not only to credibility determinations, but to findings of fact based on documentary evidence).
222. Tivo, Inc. v. Echostar Communic'ns Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1307-08 n.2 (Fcd. Cir.
2008), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 306 (2008). In ivo, an in-
fringement suit involving hardware and software technology for time shifting television
signals, a panel of the Federal Circuit upheld the trial court's construction of the term "object"
in the software claims, stating as follows:
As noted, the district court based its construction of the software claims on its con-
clusion as to what the critical claim terms would mean to a person of skill in the art.
That conclusion in turn was largely based on the court's assessment of extrinsic
evidence. Although we have characterized claim construction as a question of law
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While the de novo standard of review has been widely acknowl-
edged as creating, or at least contributing to, a number of practical
problems, the choice of an appropriate standard of appellate review
should be based upon legal principles and precedent, not expediency. It
is therefore instructive to consider the different standards of review that
have been proposed and evaluate them in light of governing cases and
legal principles. For purposes of such consideration, the suggested stan-
dards of review have been grouped in the discussion below into three
categories: (1) de novo review, (2) the clearly erroneous standard of re-
view, and (3) review based on independent judgment.
A. De Novo Review
As discussed, the Federal Circuit currently applies a de novo stan-
dard of review under Cybor, formally granting no deference to the trial
court's patent claim construction. In applying this standard, the Federal
Circuit stated in Accumed LLC v. Stryker Corp. that the court reviews
"only the district court's finished product, not its process. 223 This de
novo standard of review is based upon the holding of the Federal Circuit
that claim construction is "a purely legal question. '2,2 As discussed
herein, this position was initially taken by the Federal Circuit in its en
banc decision in Markman, a case involving a Seventh Amendment is-
sue, and was reaffirmed in Cybor on the expressly stated basis that the
Supreme Court's Markman decision confirmed the position that claim
construction is "purely legal.2 25
even when it involves competing presentations of extrinsic evidence, Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), we recognize that
there is substantial force to the proposition that such a conclusion is indistinguish-
able in any significant respect from a conventional finding of fact, to which we
typically accord deference. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469
F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc); id. at 1043 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id.
at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1045 (Ga-
jarsa, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1046 (Moore, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Applying our governing non-
deferential standard of review, we uphold the district court's conclusion in this case.
If we were to treat that ruling as a finding of fact, we would uphold the district
court's ruling a fortiori in light of the more deferential "clear error" standard appli-
cable to factual findings.
Id.
223. Accumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 483 F.3d 800, 809 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In discuss-
ing the application of the de novo standard of review, the court stated that the "atmospherics"
of a Markman claim construction hearing are "legally irrelevant." Id.
224. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
225. Id. at 1456; see supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
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However, as previously demonstrated, a careful analysis of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Markman reveals that the Supreme Court did
not take a position that claim construction is "purely legal" in its Seventh
Amendment analysis. Rather, when read in the context of the Seventh
Amendment framework employed by the Supreme Court, the words cho-
sen by the Supreme Court in characterizing claim construction as a
"mongrel practice" and as involving an issue which "falls somewhere
between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact" are incom-
patible with such a position. The distinction between an issue of fact and
law is one of constitutional significance under the Seventh Amendment.
It is not principled to base a standard of review on a determination of the
fact versus law divide made by the Federal Circuit that is at all inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment analysis as related to
the same fact versus law divide.
The Supreme Court did not decide the issue of the appellate standard
of review for patent claim construction in Markman. The policy state-
ments made by the Supreme Court in the penultimate paragraph of
Markman have created tension within the decision, as previously dis-
cussed. It would be helpful and instructive if the Supreme Court would
clarify these issues. However, the Supreme Court did expressly label the
policy discussion concerning uniformity as an "independent reason" for
having judges, rather than juries, construe patent claims. In the absence
of a direct ruling from the Supreme Court on the issue of the appropriate
standard of review on appeal, it appears principled to focus on the Sev-
enth Amendment analysis in the Supreme Court's Markman decision in
determining the fact versus law divide.
Therefore, since the Cybor rule of de novo review of patent claim
construction is expressly based on the grounds that claim construction is
"purely legal," and it is incompatible with the Supreme Court's Seventh
Amendment analysis in Markman, it is not principled.
B. Clearly Erroneous Review Under Rule 52(a)
The "clearly erroneous" standard of review under Rule 52(a) is a
leading candidate for a principled standard of appellate review for patent
claim construction based upon the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment
decision in Markman, and its decision in Dennison.
On its face, Rule 52(a) states that factual findings "must not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous."226 As previously discussed, Rule 52(a)
has repeatedly been held to apply broadly to factual findings of a judge,
without excepting any categories of fact, such as ultimate facts or
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
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subsidiary facts. 27 The clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) applies
to factual findings of a judge "whether based on oral or other evi-
dence, 22' and is not limited to determinations made by a trial judge in
assessing the credibility of witnesses.229
The application of Rule 52(a) in patent claim construction is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's decisions in both Markman and Dennison.
While the Supreme Court held in Markman that claim construction is
"exclusively within the province of the court,' 230 it did not define claim
construction as solely an issue of law in its Seventh Amendment analy-
sis, but instead chose language that characterized claim construction as
an issue involving a mix of fact and law.' Moreover, in Dennison, the
Supreme Court held that Rule 52(a) is applicable to patent cases in
which a mixed issue of fact and law arises.232
It has been proposed that Rule 52(a) should not apply to the Federal
Circuit in the same manner that it is applied to other federal appellate
courts, despite the Supreme Court's decision in the Dennison case. Pro-
fessor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has questioned the wisdom of applying
Rule 52(a) without modification to the Federal Circuit in its position as a
specialized court.233 She has argued that the assumption underlying Rule
52(a) "breaks down," since the trial court is not in as good a position as
the Federal Circuit to decide factual issues as a result of the Federal Cir-
cuit's relevant expertise and experience.M She has pointed out that since
"many if not most complex questions in patent law pose mixed fact/law
questions that are not easily disentangled," application of "the usual in-
terpretation" of Rule 52(a) to the Federal Circuit will "waste judicial
resources to disentangle the threads that went into the trial court's
judgement," and create a burden on the court to spend considerable time
227. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
228. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
229. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); see also Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dis-
senting) (stating, in the context of claim construction, that "[e]ven those findings of fact based
entirely on documentary evidence are entitled to deference.").
230. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
231. See supra notes 111, 95, 100, 105 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part I.C.
233. Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 47-52, 61-62.
234. Id. at 48.
Where, however, the trial court is composed of generalists and the appellate court is
staffed to deal with the complex factual issues being tried, the assumption breaks
down, for the appellate court is at least as well situated to find the facts as the trial
court. A trial judge who has never read a technical document before is less likely to
interpret it correctly, no matter how many witnesses are called to testify, than an ap-
pellate judge who has extensive experience in dealing with such matters.
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"explicating what it considers fact and what it considers law., 235 Finally,
Professor Dreyfuss has expressed concern that Rule 52(a) will interfere
with the Federal Circuit's congressional mandate to bring uniformity to
patent law.236
While there is some merit to the observations made by Professor
Dreyfuss, the governing law does not provide an alternate framework for
Rule 52(a) in patent cases. When Congress enacted legislation establish-
ing the Federal Circuit as a specialized court, it did not establish
specialized rules that would override Rule 52(a).233 As stated above, in
Dennison, the Supreme Court ruled that Rule 52(a) is applicable in a
patent case. Moreover, it is preferable as a policy matter not to employ
special rules for the Federal Circuit. Applying the Rule 52(a) standard of
review to patent cases at the Federal Circuit adheres to the obligation of
"responsible appellate jurisdiction" as explained by the Supreme
Court.23" This in turn places the emphasis on uniformity in the formula-
tion of the law, as previously discussed, rather than uniformity in the
application of the law in order to achieve "correct" results in individual
cases and for individual patents.239
Moreover, the application of Rule 52(a) to claim construction is not
only principled as a matter of law, it is feasible. As one of the Federal
Circuit judges has aptly remarked, albeit in a dissent, "[t]here are some
scenarios where it is difficult to weed facts from law, but claim construc-
tion is not one of them."2 0 Trial judges routinely assess underlying facts
in many areas of the law, and deserve deference due to their "unique
role" in performing this task.24'
C. Review Based upon Independent Judgment
It has been proposed that the Federal Circuit could review the claim
construction of the district courts under a theory of heightened scrutiny
235. Id. at 48-49.
236. Id. at 49-50.
237. See The Federal Court Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(relevant provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 28 of the U.S. Code).
238. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991).
239. See Monaghan, supra note 195, at 276 ("The judicial duty of appellate courts is, I
submit, limited to saying what the law is."). In the policy discussion in the penultimate para-
graph in Markman, the Supreme Court focused on uniformity in the application of the law
rather than uniformity in the formulation of the law, a focus that may be unfortunate. See
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) ("Finally, we see the im-
portance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate
all issues of construction to the court.").
240. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1334 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer,
J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting).
241. O'Malley, Saris & Whyte, supra note 31, at 679.
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akin to so-called "constitutional fact review."' In Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court held that an
appellate court must exercise independent judgment as a matter of "fed-
eral constitutional law" under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan o with
regard to a trial court's finding of actual malice in a defamation case.
The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation
case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of
First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier
of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must inde-
pendently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient
to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any
judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of
"actual malice." 5
In applying this "federal constitutional law" of independent judgment,
the Supreme Court stated that "[w]e hold that the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not
prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determina-
tion of actual malice.,24
6
While it is true that the ultimate authority for the granting of patents
is set forth in the Constitution,247 it would be hard to sustain an argument
that the construction of the meaning and scope of claims within any in-
dividual patent is an issue of such constitutional significance that it
requires application of the independent judgment rule. Citing the appli-
cation of this principle of federal constitutional law as authorizing de
novo review in First and Fourth Amendment cases where facts are "inter-
twined with a constitutional standard," one of the judges on the Federal
Circuit assessed the applicability of this type of review to claim con-
struction as follows: "[w]hile appearing from the perspective of this
court's limited sphere of influence to be dreadfully important, claim con-
struction does not implicate a constitutional value."248
242. See Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 50 n.268.
243. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984).
244. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
245. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511.
246. Id. at 514.
247. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
248. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1331 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer,
J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
Cybor is not a principled decision. It is not consistent with a fair
reading of the Supreme Court's Markman decision, particularly when
Markman is analyzed with the rigor applied to the construction of patent
claims themselves. Reviewing the words used by the Supreme Court in
its holding, in the context of the opinion as a whole, and analyzed in
light of the decision of the Federal Circuit below, it is evident that the
Supreme Court did not base its Seventh Amendment holding on the
grounds that there are no factual issues involved in claim construction.
Rather, the Supreme Court analyzed the Seventh Amendment issues in-
volved in claim construction in a manner in keeping with its general
historical approach, and in keeping with its general analysis in other
Seventh Amendment cases decided by the Court. The statements made
by the Supreme Court regarding the importance of uniformity in the con-
struction of any given patent should be taken as an "independent reason"
supporting the Markman holding, as expressly articulated by the Court,
rather than a Seventh Amendment rationale.
Further, the Federal Circuit should not act as its own lexicographer
in patent cases in making ultimate determinations regarding the fact ver-
sus law divide. The ultimate issue is one of constitutional significance
under the Seventh Amendment. It is not a question of patent law, even
though the Supreme Court may be interested in considering patent law
principles in reaching an ultimate determination concerning the fact ver-
sus law divide.
Finally, the principled and feasible choice for the appropriate stan-
dard of appellate review of patent claim construction is the clearly
erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) for all factual components of claim
construction. A de novo standard of review is not principled since it is
inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment aspects of the Supreme
Court's Markman decision, and it runs contrary to the repeated and con-
sistent word choices made by the Court indicating that the Court
considers claim construction to be a mixed issue of fact and law. More-
over, there is no principled basis for applying an independent judgment
rule to the appellate review of patent claim construction.
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